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INADEQUATE TRAINING OR INADEQUATE LAW? HOW AMERICAN
POLICING AND JURISPRUDENCE TAG TEAM TO RESIST CHANGE IN
OFFICER TRAINING PRACTICES
Brett Wolff
ABSTRACT
The state of police training in The United States today is a topic veiled in controversy. With
the recent civil rights violations making headlines across the nation, 1 scholars and laypersons seek
to understand how these violations persist today, and many cite police training as a catalyst for
change through reform.2 However, pervasive immunities and numerous legal and non-legal factors
work in tandem to perpetuate an environment that is not conducive to reform in the area of police
training. Municipalities that are heavily shielded from liability are in turn not encouraged to
properly invest in training to prevent civil rights violations without external pressures, given the
current structure of American policing and resources available.
This paper will show that training requirements in the United States are inconsistent and
woefully inadequate based on national and international comparisons, as well as through executive
reports. However, governmental bodies are slow to embrace reform because they have limited
resource and no national standard to comply with. Furthermore, they are insulated from suit for
implementing inadequate training practices by the doctrine of qualified immunity and its
involvement with suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section 1983)3 . This current

Former Police Officer Found Guilty of Violating an Arrestee’s Civil Rights by Using Excessive Force , U.S. Dep’t
of Just. (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-police-officer-found-guilty-violating-arrestee-scivil-rights-using-excessive-force; Former Lake Charles Police Officer Sentenced to 18 Months in Federal Prison
for Civil Rights Violation, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-lake-charlespolice-officer-sentenced-18-months-federal-prison-civil-rights-violation.
2 Ira Glasser, FIGHTING POLICE ABUSE: A COMMUNITY ACTION MANUAL, ACLU (Aug. 1997),
https://www.aclu.org/other/fighting-police-abuse-community-action-manual; The Wrong Training, THE I NST. FOR
CRIM. JUST. TRAINING REFORM, https://www.trainingreform.org/the-wrong-training.
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West).
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environment discourages reform in the area of police training and jeopardizes the civil rights of
citizens of The United States However, there are several considerations that could assuage these
disincentives to change or otherwise cure the shortcomings in training reform.

I.

STATE OF U.S. POLICE TRAINING TODAY

A. Policing Today
1. Overview
WHEREAS, from the beginning of this Nation, law enforcement officers have played an
important role in safeguarding the rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the
Constitution and in protecting the lives and property of our citizens; and
WHEREAS, through constant application of new procedures and techniques, such
officers are becoming more efficient in their enforcement of our laws . . . . 4
— President John F. Kennedy.
The United States of America’s relatively young policing system has undergone systemic
and rapid development since our nation’s inception. Beginning with the creation of night watches
by early colonists in the 1600’s, progressing to the first publicly funded organized police force
with officers on duty full-time was created in Boston in 1838,5 to the independent creation of
policing outfits across the nation as it expanded, it was a gradual culmination into the now 18,000+
U.S. police agencies existing within the modern day United States. 6 Because of the diverse
historical, economic, legal, geographic, and political engines that helped shape the modern
American police force, The United States does not have a centralized policing structure like many
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John F. Kennedy, Proclamation 3537—Peace Officers Memorial Day and Police Week, THE AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (May 4, 1963), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/270033.
5 Ivan A Gargurevich, The History of Policing in the United States, E. KY. U. POLICE STUD. ONLINE (2013).
6 National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data , U.S. Dep’t of Just. (October 4, 2016),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf.
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other nations.7 The vast majority of policing in the United States is local. 8 Local control of policing
is conducted through the election of officials and government leaders,9 and these officials often
play a critical role in implementing policing strategies which have an influence on the operations
of a local police agency, including police training practices. Local policing practices have their
advantages, but they also lend to the critiqued, patchwork nature of United States policing as a
whole.
This fractal nature of America’s policing is accentuated by the likes of Michael Parker
Banton, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Bristol, England and author of “The
Policeman in the Community”, who has contended that “[t]he United States has what may be the
most decentralized police system in the world, characterized by an extraordinary degree of
duplication and conflicting jurisdiction.”10 The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
reported that there are logistical issues with America’s policing structure due to its “decentralized,
fragmented, and local nature of law enforcement.”11 The current structure of American policing
has been accused of causing a litany of diverse problems, but today, in light of heightened national
exposure of civil rights violations committed by law enforcement, scholars have focused ever more
on the issue of police training statistics, standards, practices, and potential shortcomings.
2. Civil Rights Violations
The recent killings of George Floyd, Daunte Wright, Elijah McClain, Breonna Taylor,
William Green, and others have focused national attention on ongoing civil rights violations by
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Banton, M., Brodeur, J. Decentralized Police Organizations,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/police/Decentralized-police-organizations
8 National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data , supra note 6.
9 Perry Stanislas, International Perspectives on Police Education and Training , 1 R OUTLEDGE 23, 24 (Jun. 8, 2015).
10 Banton, M., Brodeur, J. International Police Organizations,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/police/International-police-organizations.
11 National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data , supra note 6.
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law enforcement and have applied pressure for wide sweeping police reform.12 While a litany of
potential causes for The United States’ civil rights shortcomings13 have been theorized, inadequate
police training has been commonly listed as a root issue by various advocates.14 Reform has been
called for,15 specifically for restructuring the quantity and content of current training practices.
3. Continuous Shortfalls of Training Adequacy in Police Departments
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 12601),16 allows the DOJ to review the practices of law enforcement
agencies that may be violating people's federal rights. Since its enactment in 1994, the DOJ has
investigated 61 police departments, leading to the signing of consent decrees with 31 agencies to
rectify constitutional issues.17 A common finding in these investigations, which occur after
complaints of civil rights violations, is that there was inadequate training in place for each
department.18 In their investigations and subsequent consent decrees, the DOJ must commonly
supplant the inadequate practices put in place by the constitutionally violating police department.19
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Rashawn Ray et al., A Better Path Forward for Criminal Justice: A Report by the Brookings-AEI Working Group
on Criminal Justice Reform (Apr. 2021).
13 World Report 2020: The United States, H UM. R TS. WATCH (2020) https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2020/country-chapters/united-states#22b5b7.
14 The Wrong Training, supra note 2; David Gutierrez, Why Police Training Must be Reformed, H ARV. KENNEDY
SCH. I NST. OF POL., https://iop.harvard.edu/get-involved/harvard-political-review/why-police-training-must-bereformed.
15 . The Change We Need: 5 Issues that Should Be Part of Efforts to Reform Policing in Local Communities ,
ADVANCEMENT PROJ., https://advancementproject.org/the-change-we-need-5-issues-that-should-be-part-of-effortsto-reform-policing-in-local-communities/.
16 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601 (West).
17 SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION CASES AND MATTERS , U.S. DEP’T OF JUST .
https://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-cases-and-matters/download#police.
18 Id. (where the DOJ found training inadequacies following their investigations into the police departments of;
Albuquerque, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, East Haven , Ferguson, Los Angeles, Maricopa County, City of
Miami, Missoula County, New Orleans, Newark, Phoenix, Portland, Seattle, Springfield, Suffolk County, and
Yonkers).
19 Id.
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B. Hour Requirements for Police Training Programs in the U.S.
“You can become a cop in six months and don’t have to have the same amount of
training as a cosmetologist. That’s insane.”
— Colin Kaepernick, Activist/ Athlete
A common outcry from activists and scholars alike is that police in The United States are
woefully undertrained,20 which contributes to civil rights violations. The most common ways these
individuals and entities illustrate their points is by comparing the minimum training requirements
for police officers with other nations, 21 accentuating the discrepancy between each state’s
minimum standards, and further comparing how much minimum training an applicant is required
to undergo before beginning their tenure as an officer compared to other professions and their
minimum training requirements.22
Nationwide, a “total of 681 state and local law enforcement training academies provided
basic training instruction to 59,511 recruits in 2018. The average length of the core basic training
program was 833 hours.”23 . On average, US officers spend around 21 weeks training before they
are qualified to go on patrol.24 These numbers statistically pale in comparison to other countries,
as a report of over 100 countries conducted by the Institute for Criminal Justice Training Reform
(ICJTR) found that “The United States has among the lowest police training requirements by
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The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
Cemil Dogutas et al., A Comparative Study of the Police Training in the United Kingdom, the United States and
Turkey, TURKISH J. OF POLICE STUD. 9, 1-20 (2007); The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
22 The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
23 Emily D. Buehler State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2018 – Statistical Tables, DEP’T OF
JUST. (July 2021) [hereinafter 2018 DOJ Report].
24 Jake Horton, How US Police Training Compares with the Rest of the World, BBC NEWS (May 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada -56834733.
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far.”25 Other nations require far more hours of training, with police in Germany, as an example,
can be required to complete up to 2861 hours of training. 26
The discrepancies pointed out by scholars and institutions regard ing police training in the
United States do not end with comparison to other countries. While a 2018 Report published by
the U.S. Department of Justice27 provides an average length of core basic training programs, each
state’s minimum requirements vary drastically due to the decentralized nature of policing. 28
Currently, each State has its own agency that establishes standards for police officer selection,
training, licensure, certification, and suspension/decertification. 29 This practice means that officers
in one part of the country will receive vastly different training than an officer in another region.
Using only the raw number of hours required to become an officer as an example, Georgia only
requires 408 hours of basic training, which pales in comparison to other states like Connecticut,
which requires 1,321 hours of training30
Finally, critics of the inadequate length of training for police officers in The United States
compare the time it takes for a trainee hopeful to become a police officer with the time it takes for
novices in other trades to become licensed/certified for their respective jobs. As aforementioned,
Georgia only requires 408 hours of basic training for prospective police officers. 31 Meanwhile,
Georgia requires 2,280 hours of training in order to become an apprentice barber. 32 Other instances
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The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
Khatia Dekanoidze and Madlen Khelashvili, Police Education and Training Systems in the OSCE Region, OSCE
164 (2018), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/7/423401.pdf.
27 2018 DOJ Report, supra note 23.
28 The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
29 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING 94 (2015),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskForce_Finalreport.pdf.
30 Basic Law Enforcement Training Program, GA. PUB. SAFETY TRAINING C ENTER, https://www.gpstc.org/aboutgpstc/training-divisions/basic-training-division/basic-police-officer-training/; The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
31 Basic Law Enforcement Training Program, supra note 30.
32 Transcript of Barber II Apprentice Training, GA ST . B OARD OF C OSMETOLOGY & B ARBERS. (July 2017).
26
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of training disparagement is prevalent across the country, notably in states such as California,33
Florida,34 Massachusetts,35 Michigan,36 and Louisiana.37
C. Average Training Program Content
The content of police training is also a heavily researched and debated topic. In the 2018
DOJ Report,38 it was found that half of recruits nationwide were instructed using a training model
with equal parts stress (i.e., military or paramilitary style) and nonstress (i.e., academic or adult
learning) environments. Over 90% of all recruits experienced some degree of paramilitary style
training.39 Nearly all recruits were instructed in report writing, defensive tactics, firearms skills,
and ethics and integrity, and nearly all were instructed using at least one type of reality-based
scenario.40 Notable from this data, the average time spent training was 833 hours over a variety of
topics, but only an average of 35 of those 833 (4.2%) are spent across the topics of
mediation/conflict management and ethics/integrity. 41 By comparison, over double that time (an
average of 73 hours) are spent on firearm training alone.42 Activist groups have their own
perceptions on the potential ramifications of training geared towards combative techniques, as
ICJTR states:
Many law enforcement training curricula focus on preparing for the potential of a threat
or threats derived from statistically singular or anecdotal events. This heavily impacts the
perceptions, biases, opinions, and attitudes that law enforcement officers carry into their
interactions with the public. Absent immediate criminal justice training reform, we will
all remain complicit in the racially biased, stereotypical depictions and dehumanization of
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The Startling Reality of Police Training Hours, VIRTRA I NC. (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.virtra.com/overview-le/
(In California, licensed cosmetologists need 1,600 hours of training; police officers in training need 664.).
34 Id. (In Florida, interior designers must have 1,760 hours of training, but police officers only need 770 .).
35 Id. (Licensed HVAC technicians in Massachusetts need 1,000 hours of training while policemen need 900 .).
36 Id. (In Michigan, licensed electric sign specialists need 4,000 hours of training; policemen need 594 .).
37 Id. (Manicurists need 500 hours of training while police officers in training only need 360.).
38 2018 DOJ Report, supra note 23.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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African Americans, and other minorities, that provoke a falsely-heightened, adversarial
perception of threat.43
D. Summary
Police training in The United States is lacking in both quantity and quality, and the civil
rights of American citizens are jeopardized as a result. Reform is theorized to be a necessary step
in protecting these rights, but the current structure of American policing makes reform difficult.
Further roadblocks and potential solutions will be covered in further sections in this paper.
II.

CIVIL DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS D UE TO I NADEQUATE TRAINING OF AN OFFICER

If a person’s civil rights have been violated or otherwise deprived in relation to a police
officer’s inadequate training, recourse can be available through the Civil Rights Act of 1871
(Section 1983). 42 U.S.C., § 1983 states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . . (emphasis added).44
While the language of 42 U.S.C., § 1983 appears broad, subsequent case law has apparently
limited its applicability to persons who have had their constitutional rights violated at the hands of
inadequately trained law enforcement personnel.
A. Bringing Suit against Individual Officers
An aggrieved party may first look to the inadequately trained police officer for redress,
however there are certain disincentives for suing individual officers alone. An aggrieved party may

43
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The Wrong Training, supra note 2.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West).
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successfully bring suit against police officers in specific instances.45 However, more typically
courts will find that suits against officials like police officers are essentially suits against their
offices, thereby immunizing police officers acting in their official capacity from suit under 42
U.S.C., § 1983.46 Furthermore, “[l]aw enforcement officers are immune from § 1983 liability
arising from official discretionary acts that do not ‘violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”. 47 In 2021, the Supreme
Court took certiorari on two suits against individual officers for excessive force and applied
qualified immunity to both cases, further reinforcing the applicability of the doctrine.48
An aggrieved party may be further disinclined to sue individual officers over other entities
for non-legal, monetary reasons. For instance, the starting salary of an NYPD police officer is
$42,500.49 For comparison, the NYPD paid $205.0 million in tort claim settlement and judgment
payouts in the year of 2020.50 The city of New York resolved $1.03 billion in claims and lawsuits
against the city in the year of 2020.51 It is no question that larger entities such as departments and
municipalities typically have larger coffers than individual defendants being sued under 42 U.S.C.,
§ 1983.

45

See Holmes v. Meleady, 965 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2013) (where police officers sued by arrestee in their
official capacity for monetary relief were “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, where the officers were city and
not state officials.); Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 527 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1976) (where the court held the New
York Transit Authority was not a “person”, but the individual named officials were “persons” within the meaning of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
46 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
47 Torian v. City of Beckley, 963 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D.W. Va. 1997) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818, (1982)).
48 See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 20-1539, 2021 WL 4822662 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2021); City of Tahlequah,
Oklahoma v. Bond, 20-1668, 2021 WL 4822664 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2021).
49 Salary and Benefits, NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/careers/police-officers/po-benefits.page.
50 Scott M. Stringer, Claims Report: Fiscal Year 2020, OFF. OF THE NY C ITY C OMPTROLLER (April 2021),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/annual-claims-report/.
51 Id.
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B. Bringing Suit Against Police Departments
Qualified immunity does more than protect individual officers, it extends to the
departments entrusted to train them as well. Police departments in jurisdictions across the nation
are heavily shielded from suit under 42 U.S.C., § 1983 due to their ties to other governmental
bodies.52 Further, the interpretations of the word “person” in the statute has a powerful
immunization effect for aggrieved parties seeking redress from various entities feasibly involved
in the improper training of an officer. Jurisdictions have widely held that a city/municipal police
department does not qualify as a “person” for the purposes of § 1983. 53
C. Bringing Suit Against Local Governments and Municipalities
One of the most common avenues of redress for aggrieved persons whose civil rights have
been violated due to improper training lies with suit against local governments or municipalities
allegedly responsible for the potential violation and improper training. Notwithstanding, just as
statutory interpretation and decades of case law has placed substantial constraints on the capacity
to sue individual officers and police departments for training inadequacies, there are still multiple
common law provisions that provide significant shields from civil right violation liability for
municipalities that a plaintiff must overcome to be successful.
Unlike police departments and state officials acting in their official capacity, municipalities
and other local government units are included among those “persons” to whom 42 U.S.C., § 1983
applies.54 Monell further states: “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether

52

See Johnson v. Hurtt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (under Texas law, county sheriff's and city
police departments generally are not legal entities capable of being sued unless they enjoy a separate legal existence)
53 See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir.1992); PBA Loc. No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F.
Supp. 808, 825 (D.N.J. 1993); Pierre v. Schlemmer, 932 F. Supp. 278, 281 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
54 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 660 (1978); Batiste v. City of Beaumont,
421 F. Supp. 2d 969, 986 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
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made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983”. 55
Specifically to failure to train claims, liability under 42 U.S.C., § 1983 may attach if police
officers are not adequately trained in relation to the tasks particular officers must perform, and the
deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, as, “[t]he way in which a City chooses to train
its police force is ‘necessarily a matter of policy.’” 56 However, despite how this language seems
to depict that 42 U.S.C., § 1983 suits against municipalities are rather straightforward, there are
multiple conditions that must be met for a plaintiff’s claim to be successful.
1. Roadblock 1: Deliberate Indifference
A municipality is liable in a Section 1983 action for the failure to train police officers only
when the failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the police come into contact.57 “Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’
choice by the municipality can the failure be properly thought of as an actionable city ‘policy.’” 58
“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” 59 As a result city policymakers must
be on actual or constructive notice of an oversight in a training program which violates a citizen’s
rights.60 But without such notice that training programs are deficient, decision makers can be
wholly insulated even in the face of constitutional violations.
A further potential bar under the deliberate indifference standard is reflected in the
Supreme Court decision in Connick v. Thompson.61 In Connick, the court found that “[a] pattern
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Monell, 436 U.S. at 569.
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d at 1389 (4th Cir. 1987)).
57 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989).
58 Id.
59 Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
60 Id.
61 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
56
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of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate
deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” 62 The court continues, stating, “[w]ithout
notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be
said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional
rights.”63 The court seemingly dismisses or at least diminishes the likelihood a single-instance
constitutional violation can succeed without a history of similar violations. 64 Only when “the
unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious . . . could [a city] be
liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.”65
Speaking strictly in terms of inadequate police officer training, it is seemingly quite
difficult to prove deliberate indifference. As legal scholars aptly describe, “[a] training program
for police officers must be quite deficient in order for the deliberate indifference standard to be
met, in an action, alleging that a city's failure to adequately train officers resulted in constitutional
violations by the officers.”66
2. Roadblock 2: Causally Related
In a number of jurisdictions, there can be no basis for liability if there is no evidence to
establish that any training deficiency was causally connected to law enforcement officer's acts
alleged to be unconstitutional.67 Stated alternatively, the identified deficiency in the training
program must be closely related to the ultimate injury. Thus, respondent must still prove that a

62

Id. at 61.
Id.
64 Id.; see Robinson v. Keita, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Colo. 2014) (where four unsubstantiated complaints in five
years were not notice of widespread pattern of constitutional violations).
65 Canton, 563 U.S. at 397, 398.
66 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights § 461. See also Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2010); Young v.
City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005); Nelson v. County of Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d
1159 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
67 See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016); Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381
F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir. 2004); Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911–12 (5th Cir.1998); Benhaim v. Borough of
Highland Park, 79 F. Supp. 3d 513 (D.N.J. 2015).
63
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deficiency in training actually caused the police officers to act in a way that was constitutionally
improper. Should the officers act outside the purview of their training, the municipality is likely
insulated.68 If the officers act within the purview of their training, and their actions were
constitutionally impermissible, but were not closely enough related to the plaintiff’s injury, the
municipality may also be insulated from liability.
An alleged link between city police officers' violations of constitutional rights of citizens
and alleged deficiencies in city's training program for police officers must not be too tenuous in a
§ 1983 claim against a city/municipality based on the failure to train. 69 In Forrest v. Perry, officers
who allegedly violated arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and to
be free from false arrest knew their conduct was criminal and used their authority to pressure
victims to refrain from immediately reporting their activities. 70 The court found that because the
officer’s conduct was knowingly criminal, changes to training protocol would have made no
difference, and the link was too tenuous.71
3. A Note: Federal Judiciary Resistance to Altering the Current Standard.
The Court in Canton expressed their intent to not deviate from the standards set forth above
for a myriad of reasons. When finished with their discussion on the various road blocks to litigation
stated above, the Court summarized their fears by stating:
To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation listed above would open municipalities to
unprecedented liability under § 1983; would result in de facto respondeat superior
liability, a result rejected in Monell; would engage federal courts in an endless exercise of
second-guessing municipal employee-training programs, a task that they are ill suited to
undertake; and would implicate serious questions of federalism. 72

68

See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1060; Carswell, 381 F.3d at 244; Smith, 158 F.3d at 911–12; Benhaim, 79 F. Supp. 3d at
513.
69 See Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2019).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 109.
72 Canton, 563 U.S. at 391, 392.
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III.

OBSTACLES TO REFORM : LEGAL, STRUCTURAL, AND FINANCIAL DISINCENTIVES

There is little incentive and lackluster motivation to alter or otherwise improve the state of
American police training procedures across the nation due to myriad of legal and non-legal factors.
The legal landscape of 42 U.S.C., § 1983 outlined in Part 2 creates near-immunity to suit across
the strata of those involved in suits for inadequate training, thereby disincentivizing change.
Outside the realm of 42 U.S.C., § 1983, several non-legal factors such as resources, effective
breach, and lack of a national structure work to further disincentive reform. Without addressing
these legal and non-legal factors, police training procedures will likely remain unchanged and
further instances of improper, unconstitutional conduct could persist without cure.
A. Legal Disincentives to Reform
Municipalities and cities, as pointed out in Part 1, are solely responsible for the creation of
and implementation of training programs for their local police departments, and thus are
realistically the only parties that face threat from suits alleging inadequate training for police
officers resulting in a civil rights violation. However, they are incredibly well insulated from any
retribution for improperly training their local police. As discussed at length in Part 2, there are a
vast number of roadblocks in the way of plaintiff’s trying to achieve recompense against a
governmental entity for their deprivation of their civil rights. Looking specifically at claims made
for failure to train, it is evident that it is extremely difficult for cities and municipalities to face any
consequences for implementing an inadequate program. Furthermore, municipalities are
disincentivized from investigating or curing deficiencies in existing training programs.
1. Disincentive to Implement Adequate Program
Based on the composition of failure to train case law, a municipality need hardly consider
constitutional shortcomings in the implementation of a new police training program. This is
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because for liability to attach under 42 U.S.C., § 1983, the Supreme Court suggests that a pattern
of constitutional violations must be established.73 In this way, a municipality’s training program
can be analogized to a dog under the now practically archaic “one-bite-rule” found in English
Common Law.74 This common law rule has history tracing back to ancient times, as the The Bible
contains the following:
If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his
flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.
But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his
owner, and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a woman; the ox shall
be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death. 75
The one bite rule, as its name and history denotes, shields the owner of a domestic animal
from civil liability to the first victim of their dog’s “first bite.”76 This practice, while popular prior
to the 20th century,77 has been largely abandoned in the United States.78 However, it appears that
municipalities still enjoy a one free bite-like shield from liability the first time that a constitutional
shortcoming or infraction occurs as a result of an inadequate training program.
With the current legal makeup of 42 U.S.C., § 1983, municipalities can implement
inadequate training programs with the confidence that they can be largely 79 free from liability from
the first constitutional infraction that may occur. 80 Because of this, municipalities are likely to

73

Connick, 563 U.S. at 51.
Kenneth M. Phillips, The History of the “One Bite Rule”, http://dogbitelaw.com/one-bite-rule/history-of-the-onebite-rule.html.
75 Exodus 21:28-29 (King James).
76 Allison E. Butler, Cause of Action Against Owner, Keeper or Harborer of Domestic Animal to Recover for
Personal Injuries Caused by Animal, 33 Causes of Action 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007).
77 David Goguen, State Dog Bite Laws: "One-Bite" vs. Strict Liability,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/one-bite-strict-liability-dog-bite.html
78 Id.; Hamilton v. Walker, 510 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. App. 1998) (Banke, J., dissenting).
79 But see Canton, 563 U.S. at 381 (where the court determined that a municipality can be liable
for failure to train its police force when a plaintiff proves that the municipality acted recklessly, intentionally, or
with gross negligence).
80 Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (where the court found that by failing to
allege a pattern of constitutional violations, plaintiff did not satisfy their obligation to allege facts to show that the
defendant “disregarded the known or obvious consequence that a particular omission in their training program
would cause [municipal] employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights”).
74

16

enact training practices with latent deficiencies only discoverable from further investigation, 81 of
which is unlikely to take place until a violation has occurred .
2. Disincentive to Investigate Program
Another barrier to diagnosing and reforming deficient training programs is the legal
disincentive to investigate potential constitutional shortcomings in existing training programs
under 42 U.S.C., § 1983. As stated in Part 2, a policymaker must be on actual or constructive
notice of an oversight in a training program which violates a citizen’s rights in order to incur
liability for failure to train. Under this standard, a municipality could almost 82 completely avoid
liability if they are ignorant of potential oversights in their training practices. In fact, by executing
an investigation into its existing training program, a municipality could expose itself to liability
after gaining actual knowledge of a training oversight that it otherwise would not have incurred.
After learning of the oversight and subsequently failing to adequately address it, the municipality
could be liable for 42 U.S.C., § 1983 violations simply because they took the altruistic step of
trying to identify potential constitutional shortcomings in their existing police training regime.
Otherwise stated, investigation ultimately invites the possibility of suit, as latent defects do not
impute liability on the entity or its policymakers. The common adage, “ignorance is bliss”, is
applicable in many contexts. However, against the legal backdrop of 42 U.S.C., § 1983, ignorance
is more than bliss. Ignorance is safety.
3. Disincentive to Cure Inadequate Program
Governmental entities are ultimately disincentivized to cure inadequate training procedures
already in place, even if they are potentially aware of the defect, because of the difficulty of success
in single-incident civil rights violation suits. As discussed at length in Part 2, there several
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roadblocks that must be hurdled before a wronged plaintiff can succeed in a claim against a
government entity. Because plaintiffs must establish a causal link between the potentially
inadequate training and the alleged constitutional deprivation, overcome the stringent standard of
“deliberate indifference”, and allege sufficient facts to overcome the lofty burdens of proof83
inherent with 42 U.S.C., § 1983 claims, a government entity can maintain a heightened degree of
confidence that they will be successful in the event of a suit. Especially considering the various
non-legal factors discouraging reform, municipalities and local governments may think twice
before deciding to cure existing deficiencies in their police training programs.
B. Non-Legal Disincentives to Reform
Governmental entities have limited funds and resources, a fact Americans are reminded of
every time they drive over a pothole or notice a bump in our income taxes. As such, the budgets
of publicly funded police departments are constrained just like any other governmental program.
Today, police departments across the nation are experiencing some of the most d ramatic budget
cuts in a decade.84 A survey conducted by The Police Executive Research Forum found that nearly
half of responding police agencies reported reductions impacting vital areas of operation such as
equipment, hiring, and training.85 These budget cuts sweeping across the nation 86 are affecting
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minor and major cities alike, as Los Angeles,87 Minneapolis,88 and departments everywhere are
facing restrictions and pressure to cut spending. Considering this notion, coupled with the public
outcry for “defunding the police” gaining ground 89 and circulating the news in the early parts of
2020 and beyond,90 a local government body may have difficulty justifying even a small increase
in spending to rehaul their potentially defective training programs. As it stands today, many
departments are already underfunded and struggling to pay for existing training practices.91
1. Efficient Breach
On June 9, 1978, Ford Motor Company agreed to recall over a million Ford Pinto’s for
fuel tank design defects, which made the vehicles susceptible to fire and explosion in the event of
a relatively moderate-speed rear end collision.92 The action was the result of a national
investigation, sparked in large part by publicity generated by national publication of the hazard
and the largest punitive damages awarded by a California jury to a young man who had been
severely injured in a Pinto fuel tank fire.93
It was found in internal Ford Motor Company documents that Ford knew of the weakness
in the fuel tank before the vehicle was placed on the market, but that a cost/benefit study was done
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which suggested that it would be “cheaper” for Ford to pay liability for burn deaths and injuries
rather than modify the fuel tank to prevent the fires in the first place. 94 Ford owned a patent on a
better designed gas tank at that time, but estimated the cost of changing the fuel system was to be
$11 per car across 12.5 million cars and light trucks (all manufacturers), for a total of $137
million.95 Using another cost analysis, Ford estimated that the design changes would prevent
approximately 180 burn deaths and 180 serious injuries per year, which to litigate would cost $49.5
million.96
This famous historical instance referenced above has become what is known as the theory
of “effective breach”. Effective breach crops up in various areas of the law such as contract and
tort, but universally tends to mean the same thing: sometimes it is more cost effective to breach a
contract or otherwise knowingly break some legal constraint because it is more cost effective than
adhering to the legal constraint. In Ford’s case, they knew that their fuel tanks were defective, but
they chose to keep them because the cost to replace them was higher than paying for damages.
With regards to municipalities and cities with defective police training programs, the theory of
effective breach can be yet an additional disincentive to change.
As discussed above, it is already difficult for a governmental body to be found liable for
unconstitutional harm as a result of failure to train. In some instances, it could be quite expensive
to implement a newer training procedure, with longer hours or a more advanced curriculum that
must be paid for. It would be dependent on the region and unique challenges facing a particular
government entity, but even implicit theories of effective breach could motivate a municipality or
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city to be resistant to change. If the defective motor of police training would cost an immense sum
of money to replace across the board, would the chances of a fiery death of the civil rights of the
few be worth it, especially with the stalwart shield of 42 U.S.C., § 1983 case law allowing
governmental bodies to escape the flames unscathed?
2. Lack of National Structure
As discussed in Part 1, The United States does not have a national structure or standard for
police training protocol like many other countries. 97 Instead, our policing system is based upon a
patchwork of local entities, governed by municipalities and cities, who are independently
responsible for their own police training procedures. 98 This means that any given region in the
United States could have training more effective at combating potential civil rights violations of
the region's constituents than others. One state can mandate over a hundred hours in de-escalation
techniques training, another mandating hundreds of hours in constitutional rights training in the
realm of 4th amendment searches and seizures, and another state could focus 25% of its training
on racial sensitivity and bias courses, all while another state mandates 5 hours of training in each.
With such discrepancies, the civil rights of citizens could be jeopardized in some regions more
than others based purely on the decisions of their local legislatures.
The current lack of a national minimum standard for police training has its own detriments
and potential positives, but it undoubtedly creates an environment less conducive to change with
respect to 42 U.S.C., § 1983. While a lack of a national structure itself does not serve as a barrier
to improving policing practices, without standards states can have woefully incompetent training
practices without any federal recourse. Scholars, activists, and political commentators currently
admonish the United States for its local inconsistencies, and for its abysmal training requirements
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compared to other countries.99 Absent internal pressure from local citizens and internal
legislatures, local entities can impetuously promulgate inadequate training practices at the expense
of the potential violation of their citizens’ civil rights.
IV.

A FEW POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The current legal and quasi-legal state of 42 U.S.C., § 1983 manufactures an environment
that is naturally resistant to improving the quality of police training in The United States. Risk of
poor training practices and subsequent harm to citizens’ civil rights is ever present, as evidenced
by the frequent news headlines recounting tales of unconstitutional actions on behalf of police
officers.100 There are, however, possible measures that can be taken to belay or otherwise
counteract the negative effects perpetuated by this environment, and better equip officers to deal
with constitutionally risky situations.
A. Tackling Qualified Immunity
1. Judicial Intervention
There are numerous judicial changes, ranging from complete abolition101 to slight
alterations, to the judicial doctrine of qualified immunity that would consequently improve the
state of police training in The United States. Abolishing qualified immunity seems to be a currently
unlikely prospect,102 and its consequences in terms of training have been argued to be boundless.103
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However, specifically targeting how courts treat municipal liability has recent judicial
development 104 and has perhaps the best potential for improvement in the realm of police training.
In J.K.J. v. Polk County,105 the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found a municipality was liable
for plaintiff’s injuries under § 1983 when municipality inadequately trained staff member who
sexually assaulted the plaintiffs. The court recognized the lofty standards put forth by the Supreme
Court in Canton106 were substantial hurdles for the plaintiff to overcome, particularly because the
plaintiff failed to allege facts that there was a pattern of sexual assaults by prison staf f to put the
municipality on actual or constructive notice so as to constitute “deliberate indifference”. 107 The
court addressed the deliberate indifference standard that other circuits have found plaintiffs were
unable to overcome108 by referring to the Canton “doorway”, where the need to train officers in
the constitutional limitations for certain situations can be said to be so obvious that failure to do
so could qualify as ‘deliberate indifference’.109 The 7th Circuit noted that “[i]n Bryan County,110
the [Supreme] Court confirmed that City of Canton ‘did not foreclose the possibility that evidence
of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to
train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a
violation, could trigger municipal liability.’”111
The 7th Circuit has demonstrated that courts can use the Canton doorway as a tool to expand
municipal liability for failure to train. Courts could effectively (even if not intentionally) broaden
the quantity and quality of required training for government officials by declaring more areas and
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situations as ones that present obvious potential for constitutional liability. This judicially driven
expansion of municipal liability could have the potential to cure the police training shortcomings
facing The United States today.112
2. Legislative Intervention
Legislative reform regarding 42 U.S.C., § 1983 has been proposed,113 advocated for,114 and
at least partially enacted 115 across the nation in recent years. Legislative reform of qualified
immunity for failure to train has the same potential of tangentially improving the state of American
police training the same way that judicial intervention does, by exposing municipalities to more
liability in the event that they inadequately train their officers.
This concept is evidenced in Colorado’s bold action of becoming the first state to statutorily
limit the use of qualified immunity as a defense in law enforcement cases at the state level through
the passing of SB 217 (2020).116 Included in this legislature, which primarily encourages peace
officers to employ nonviolent means before resorting to the use of physical force, is the condition
that law enforcement agencies in the state shall train its peace officers on the law’s provisions.117
While the passing of this legislature is new, and its effects have yet to be fully studied, it is evidence
that States can indeed expand liability for state actors and reduce qualified immunity. Legislature
like SB 217118 passed in Colorado has the potential to increase local government interest in
adequately training its officers, as municipalities cannot easily hide under the shield of qualified
immunity if their State does not make it a viable defense for certain actions.
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B. The National Standard: A Synergistic Approach to Address Efficient Breach, Lack of
Uniformity, Training Content and Quality, and Budgetary Constraints.
In May of 2015, United States President Barack Obama created the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing (“Task Force”) via an executive order signed on December 18, 2014 in
response to the unrest in Ferguson, Missouri following the shooting of Michael Brown by a police
officer.119 The Task Force, charged with the task of identifying the best policing practices, made
the recommendation120 that the Federal Government should “support the development of
partnerships with training facilities across the country to promote consistent standards for high
quality training and establish training innovation hubs” (emphasis added). 121 The Task Force
suggested that federally supported regional training hubs could be utilized to promote national
police training practices while still accounting for regional variations. 122 Local governments could
be further incentivized to enroll in these programs via federal funding. 123 The Task Force also
suggested utilizing state policing boards and commissions to collaborate to more effectively
promote the program.124
The recommendation125 proposed by the Task Force would be a meaningful step towards
the implementation of a more collaborative, national police training standard. As discussed earlier,
the lack of a national standard or structure in police training means that local government entities
can implement woefully incompetent training procedures without fear of legal retribution.
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Insulated by the great deference given to local cities and municipalities in implementing their own
policies, these entities have little incentive to improve potentially poor practices. With some form
of national standardization, states/cities/municipalities would be encouraged or otherwise
incentivized to maintain at least basic training practices deemed adequate by the Federal
Government for the protection of civilians’ civil rights.
Expanding beyond the proposal by the Task Force, the creation of a true National Structure
for police training can potentially ameliorate many of the woes facing police training reform in
The United States. One way the federal government can regulate police training to address the
problem areas of efficient breach, training content/quality, and budgetary constraints is through
the utilization of the spending power. The spending power doctrine allows Congress to impose
conditions on federal grants of funds money offered, as long as conditions are for the general
welfare, its terms are unambiguous, there is a relation between the purpose of program and the
condition required, and the imposed conditions are not sufficiently coercive.126 The effectiveness
of this congressional power is reflected in South Dakota v. Dole.127 In Dole, Congress sought to
encourage a national minimum drinking age of 21 by offering highway funds to states, but would
retain 5% if the state’s minimum drinking age was under 21. 128 Operating in a similar manner, the
Federal Government could create a federal funding structure for state police training programs,
conditioned on compliance with certain conditions.
With a federal funding system in place, the problems of local municipality resource
constriction and the tangentially related issue of efficient breach would be diminished. As of 2018,
most spending on police was done by local governments (86 percent on average).129 An influx of
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federal resources could lessen the pressures expressed in Part 3. With an influx of funds, the scales
of effective breach weighing the costs of reform and the costs of lawsuit could tip in favor of
reform. Considering there is a substantial government interest in protecting the constitutional rights
of its citizens,130 federal investment in this area is not out of question.
Utilizing the spending power and creating a national system can also reconfigure the
content and quantity of police training in The United States. In addition to recommending a more
consistent training standard, the Presidential Task Force also advises that basic training should
have a better focus on lessons to improve social interaction as well as tactical skills.131 The Task
Force specifically recommends focus in the areas of “critical thinking, social intelligence, implicit
bias, [and] fair and impartial policing . . . .”132 These themes of training content reconfiguration
have been requested by multitudes of activist organizations,133 and a national system as prescribed
above can serve to address these concerns.134 Furthermore, a national standard for quantity of
training hours required of police personnel can help raise our abysmally low hour count (compared
to that of other countries).135
C. Proactive Investigation
Finally, police departments and municipalities can conduct internal investigations to selfassess the adequacy of their training programs, 136 despite the risk of liability in doing so as
described in Part 3. Unfortunately, most investigations such as these occur after a civil rights
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violation has occurred.137 The Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, launched in
the wake of the death of Freddie Gray, uncovered a number of deficiencies in the department,
including the systemic failure to train its officers.138
Investigations such as the one carried out in Baltimore are indicative of this notion: tragic
deaths should not be one of the sole catalysts that trigger investigations into the adequacy of
training programs. Routine inspections could have the effect of refining training programs and
correcting inadequate practices. In some instances, it could also be a way to protect the rights of
citizens, or even save their lives. Encouragement to conduct investigation into police training can
be sourced from anywhere, ranging from private citizens, interest groups,139 and even the
President.140
V.

CONCLUSION

The populace of The United States has been calling for police reform in the wake of civil rights
violations making headlines across the nation. One specific area that has been heavily scrutinized
is the content and quantity of training required of police. In this area, however, legal and non-legal
barriers create an environment not conducive to change. While the factors contributing to this
environment are numerous and seemingly entrenched in our society, there can be steps taken, large
or small, to help facilitate police training reform and consequently better protect the civil rights of
American citizens.
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